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We extend the formalism of cluster state quantum secret sharing, as presented in Markham and
Sanders [Phys. Rev. A 78, 042309 (2008)] and Keet et al. [Phy. Rev. A 82, 062315 (2010)],
to the continuous-variable regime. We show that both classical and quantum information can be
shared by distributing continuous-variable cluster states through either public or private channels.
We find that the adversary structure is completely denied from the secret if the cluster state is
infinitely squeezed, but some secret information would be leaked if a realistic finitely squeezed state
is employed. We suggest benchmarks to evaluate the security in the finitely squeezed cases. For
the sharing of classical secrets, we borrow techniques from the continuous-variable quantum key
distribution to compute the secret sharing rate. For the sharing of quantum states, we estimate the
amount of entanglement distilled for teleportation from each cluster state.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a cryptographic task aiming to dis-
tribute a secret amongst a group of parties. A good se-
cret sharing protocols should allow authorised subsets of
parties, known as the access structure, to faithfully re-
construct the secret, while other unauthorized parties,
known as the adversary structure, are denied any infor-
mation about the secret. Classical secret sharing proto-
cols have been proposed [1, 2] where classical information
is encoded by a mathematical transformation. The proto-
cols can be proven to be information-theoretically secure,
i.e., no information about the secret can be obtained by
the adversary structure even when they have unlimited
computational power, if the communication channels be-
tween the dealer and the parties are secure.
Following the rapid development of quantum infor-
mation, the extension of secret sharing to the quan-
tum regime has received much theoretical attention [3–6].
The objective of quantum secret sharing (QSS) is to use
the quantum correlations in well-constructed entangled
states to securely transmit a set of classical or quantum
information to only the access structures. As the involv-
ing parties are supposed to be spatially well separated,
an optical system is the most suitable implementation
for QSS due to its excellent mobility. Several proof-of-
principle experiments have already been demonstrated
[7–9]. However, constructing a large-scale optical QSS
state is technically challenging, because the nonlinear in-
teraction between photons is weak, and some QSS pro-
tocols require more than two quantum levels, where the
commonly employed polarisation encoding is not applica-
ble. Recently, Markham and Sanders [10] proposed a uni-
fied QSS approach based on qubit cluster states [11, 12],
which could be constructed efficiently using only linear
optics and post-selection [13–15].
Cluster states have another advantage in that an N -
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mode cluster is well characterised by N stabilisers or an
N -vertex connected graph, in contrast to a general quan-
tum state that have to be expressed in an exponential
number of superpositions. Therefore, the theoretical con-
struction and the security analysis of a cluster state QSS
scheme could be simplified. The idea of cluster state
QSS has also been extended to odd-dimensional states
(qudits) in [16].
In this paper, we further extend the idea of clus-
ter state QSS into the continuous-variable (CV) regime.
While many quantum information protocols can be op-
tically implemented by using discrete- or continuous-
variable formalism, CV systems have the advantages that
multi-partite entangled states can be produced determin-
istically, and the measurement is high in fidelity using
present technology. In particular, CV cluster states are
proposed to be useful resources to conduct measurement-
based universal quantum computation [17, 18]. A CV
cluster state can be efficiently implemented in an optical
system by various approaches including the conventional
method of controlled-phase (CPHASE) operation [17, 19],
linear optics with offline squeezing [20], optical paramet-
ric oscillator [21–23], and quantum nondemolition gate
[24]. Recently, CV cluster states involving four optical
modes have been demonstrated experimentally [25, 26].
For simplicity, we consider the CV cluster states are pre-
pared by the conventional method of CPHASE operation,
though the states can be equivalently prepared by other
approaches, and our result is independent to the method
of state preparation.
The main objective of this work is to investigate how
CV cluster states can be used to securely share quantum
and classical secrets. Instead of directly extending the
qudit approach to the d→∞ limit, a CV cluster state is
critically different from its discrete-variable counterparts
in that a perfect (infinitely squeezed) CV cluster state
is physically and hence, practically, impossible. We find
that when realistic finitely squeezed cluster states are in-
stead utilised, QSS is still possible but the security is
inevitably reduced, i.e., the secret is not precisely recov-
ered by the access structure while partial information is
2leaked to unauthorised parties. We suggest benchmarks
to evaluate the performance of each of the QSS tasks.
For the sharing of classical information, we calculate the
amount of secure key that can be distilled from each clus-
ter state for encoding the secret. A procedure is provided
to transform the distilled state to the standard form that
can be analysed by the techniques in CV quantum key
distribution (QKD). For the sharing of quantum informa-
tion, we estimate the number of cluster states required to
establish a high fidelity teleportation channel to transmit
the secret state. The amount of entanglement is quanti-
fied by the logarithmic negativity. In both tasks, we give
two examples to demonstrate the decoding and security
analysis procedures.
As we want to focus our discussion on the applica-
tion of the quantum correlations of CV cluster states,
the states received by the parties are assumed to be the
same as when prepared by the dealer, i.e., all quantum
channels are ideal (noiseless and lossless). Detections are
also assumed to be perfect in fidelity.
Our paper is outlined as follows. In Sec. II, we intro-
duce QSS and classify it into three tasks. The physical
and mathematical background of CV cluster states are
also reviewed. In Sec. III and IV, we analyse the se-
curity of classical information sharing when the cluster
state is delivered through secure and insecure channels
respectively. In Sec. V, we discuss the performance of
quantum state sharing. We conclude in Sec VI. with a
short discussion.
We denote the quantities of the access structure by the
subscript A, that of the adversary structure by E, and
that of the dealer by D. We pick ~ = 1 in the following
calculations, and all logarithms are to base 2.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Quantum secret sharing
In literatures, the idea of QSS is developed to serve
one of the following three tasks [10]:
CC: Classical information is shared among parties by
distributing QSS states through private (secure) chan-
nels, which are invulnerable to eavesdropping. The role
of quantum resources is to substitute the classical secret
sharing encoding by the quantum correlations in a QSS
state.
CQ: Classical information is shared among parties by
distributing QSS states through public (insecure) chan-
nels, which are open for eavesdropping. The quantum
correlations in the QSS states can be used both to detect
the disturbance of eavesdropping and to encode secret
sharing. When comparing with the hybrid approach that
unifies classical secret sharing and QKD, the CQ scheme
can reduce the cost of communication [3].
QQ: Also known as quantum state sharing, a secret
quantum state is shared among parties by distributing
QSS states through public channels. The QQ scheme can
be implemented by either encoding the quantum secret
into a QSS state, or using a QSS state to distribute en-
tanglement between the dealer and the access structure
for teleporting the secret state. We consider the later
approach in the current paper.
The three tasks form a hierarchy of the required re-
sources, i.e., a QQ quantum state can perform all the
three tasks, and a CQ state can be used for CC, while
the reverse is not always true. In principle, construct-
ing a QQ state is versatile, but the amount of resources
and the required infrastructure can be optimised accord-
ing to the properties of the shared information and the
channels.
For CC and CQ, we consider the cluster states are mea-
sured by the dealer and the access structure. Because of
the entanglement, random but strongly correlated mea-
surement outcomes will be obtained, from which the
dealer and the access structure can distill secure keys.
Therefore the secret sharing rate, i.e., the amount of clas-
sical information securely shared in each round of QSS,
is determined by the net amount of secure key distilled
from each cluster state.
For QQ, we consider the dealer and the access struc-
ture extract entanglement from the cluster states. Af-
ter accumulating enough extracted states, entanglement
distillation can be conducted to distill a more entangled
state, through which the secret state can be teleported
from the dealer to the access structure with higher fi-
delity.
We note that in all the QSS tasks, the objective of
the dealer is to securely transmit the secret to the access
structure, although the identities of the access structure
are not revealed until all QSS states have been received.
Because, in a secure protocol, the mutual information
between the dealer and the access structure is larger than
the information obtained by the adversary structure, the
access structure’s identities can be authenticated using
parts of the shared information. The dealer should then
trust the access structure and co-operate in subsequent
post-processing of the shared QSS states.
We also note that in the limit of infinite squeezing, our
cluster state scheme is not as general as the QQ scheme
proposed in Ref. [6]. However our scheme is interesting
because all three kinds of QSS are considered in a unified
approach, and the resource state is a cluster state that
can be efficiently constructed and can be easily analysed.
B. Continuous-variable cluster states
As an analog to the discrete-variable cluster state,
which is formed by preparing all qudits in an eigen-
state of the generalised Pauli X operator and then ap-
plying CPHASEgate, a CV cluster state is formed by
first preparing all quantum modes as squeezed vacuum
states and applying CV CPHASE gates, given by Cˆ =
exp{iAij qˆiqˆj}. An n-mode CV cluster state can be char-
acterised by an n-vertices graph, where the quantum
3modes act as the vertices V = {vi}, and a CPHASE op-
eration is applied across edges E = {eij = {vi, vj}} with
weight Aij [16]. The CV cluster state |Ψ〉 is defined as
|Ψ〉 :=
∏
eij∈E
exp{iAij qˆiqˆj}|ψ0〉⊗n , (1)
where in the infinitely squeezing case
|ψ0〉infinite = |0〉p , where pˆ|0〉p = 0 , (2)
and in the finitely squeezing case
|ψ0〉finite =
√
σ
pi1/4
∫
e−σ
2q2/2|q〉qdq , (3)
where |q〉q is the eigenstate of qˆ with eigenvalue q; σ is a
parameter characterising the degree of squeezing.
1. Nullifier representation
Apart from the ket vector representation, an infinitely
squeezed cluster state can be characterised by its sta-
bilisers [18, 27]. A stabiliser Sˆ of a state |ψ〉 is defined
as the operator of which |ψ〉 is an eigenstate with +1
eigenvalue, i.e., Sˆ|ψ〉 = |ψ〉. Analogous to the discrete-
variable cluster state, an n-mode infinitely squeezed CV
cluster state has at least n independent stabilisers. Al-
though any sum and product of the stabilisers is a new
stabiliser, the whole set of stabilisers uniquely specifies
the cluster state [28].
In a CV system, considering the nullifiers of a cluster
state is sometimes more convenient than the stabilisers.
A nullifier Nˆ is defined as an operator of which |ψ〉 is
an eigenstate with eigenvalue 0, i.e., Nˆ |ψ〉 = 0. There
can be infinitely many choice of nullifiers as any sum and
product of nullifiers is another nullifier. For an infinitely
squeezed CV cluster state, we choose a set of nullifiers,
which we call the standard set, i.e., [28]
Nˆi = pˆi −
∑
j∈N
Aij qˆj , (4)
where the position operators are summed over indices
of the neighbours of the vertex i in the graph, i.e.,
j|(i, j) ∈ E . The standard nullifiers can be constructed
by considering that before the CPHASE operations, the
squeezed vacuum modes are nullified by pˆi’s. The
CPHASE operation between the mode i and j transforms
the nullifiers as pˆi → eiAij qˆi qˆj pˆie−iAij qˆi qˆj = pˆi − Aij qˆj .
From the construction procedure, it can be easily shown
that all standard nullifiers commute and are linearly in-
dependent.
2. Wigner function representation
As an extension to the nullifier representation, the
Wigner function is a good description of the quantum
correlation of finitely squeezed CV cluster states. The
Wigner function of a single mode CV state ρˆ is defined
as [28]
W (q, p) :=
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(ipx)
〈
q − x
2
∣∣∣
q
ρˆ
∣∣∣q + x
2
〉
q
dx ,
(5)
where the definition can be trivially generalised to the
multi-mode state. The Wigner function of n finitely
squeezed vacuum states is given by
W0(q,p) =
1
pin
n∏
i
exp(−σ2i q2i ) exp
(
− p
2
i
σ2i
)
, (6)
and that of a finitely squeezed CV cluster state is
Wc(q,p) ≡W0(q,N) = 1
pin
n∏
i
exp(−σ2i q2i ) exp
(
−N
2
i
σ2i
)
,
(7)
where q = (q1, . . . qn)
T , p = (p1, . . . pn)
T , and N =
(N1, . . . Nn)
T ; Ni is the standard nullifier in Eq. (4)
with the operators replaced by the respective scalar vari-
ables; the initial degree of squeezing of each mode i is
σi. In the infinitely squeezing limit, i.e., σi → 0 ∀i, the
exp(−σ2i q2i ) would converge to a constant function while
the exp(−Ni/σ2i ) term becomes a delta function, i.e.,
Winfinite(q,p) ∝
n∏
i
δ(Ni) . (8)
3. Correlations of measurement
Consider an infinitely squeezed CV cluster state is lo-
cally measured by the operators {Mˆi}, where Mˆi is a
linear combination of qˆi and pˆi, i.e., homodyne detection
in a rotated basis. If the measurements are compatible
to a nullifier, there exists a linear combination of Mˆi’s
that equals to a linear combination of standard nullifiers,
i.e.,
∑
i=1,n kiMˆi =
∑
i=1,n liNˆi for some real ki’s and
real li’s, then the measurement outcomes would be cor-
related due to the entanglement as
∑
i=1,n kiMi = 0.
Similar quantum correlations of measurements prevail
in finitely squeezed CV cluster states, but the accuracy
depends on the degree of squeezing. Consider a finitely
squeezed CV cluster state is measured by the same set
of measurement operators {Mˆi}, the expectation value of
the measurement outcomes are statistically correlated as
in the infinitely squeezed case, i.e.,〈 ∑
i=1,n
kiMˆi
〉
=
〈 ∑
i=1,n
liNˆi
〉
= 0 . (9)
However, the variance is finite, i.e.,〈
∆
( ∑
i=1,n
kiMˆi
)2〉
=
〈
∆
( ∑
i=1,n
liNˆi
)2〉
=
∫ ( ∑
i=1,n
liNi
)2
Wc(q,p)d
nqdnp =
∑
i=1,n
l2i σ
2
i
2
,(10)
4but scales as σ2i that is small. The correlation comes from
the exp(−N2i /σ2i ) terms in Eq. (7), which are narrow
width Gaussian functions.
In subsequent discussions, we regard a quantum cor-
relation is “strong” if the collective variance of the lo-
cal measurement outcomes is small, and so the modes
are strongly correlated if their local operators produce
strong correlations. Our QSS scheme is secure if the ac-
cess structure is stronger correlated to the secret than
the unauthorised parties. According to Eq. (10), the lo-
cal measurement operators are strongly correlated if they
linearly combine as a nullifier and σi’s are small, so we
usually encode the secret in nullifiers.
4. Cluster-class state
A class of states that shares similar properties as the
CV cluster state can be constructed by applying local
Gaussian operators onto |Ψ〉. The operations linearly
transform the quadrature operators in nullifiers, as well
as the quadrature parameters in the Wigner function, as
qˆ → aq qˆ + bqpˆ + cq and pˆ → apqˆ + bppˆ + cp for some
real constants a, b, c that obey the uncertainty principle.
General linear transformations can be implemented by
only three kinds of basic operators [29]: displacement,
squeezing, and Fourier operator.
A displacement operator Dˆ(α) shifts a nullifier by a
constant factor, i.e., the components in nullifiers are
transformed as qˆ → qˆ+√2Re(α) and pˆ→ pˆ+√2Im(α).
All the displacements do not affect the measurement ba-
sis nor the variance of the quantum correlations, but only
the expectation values of the measurement results are
changed. A squeezing operator Sˆ(γ) = exp(−ir(qˆpˆ +
pˆqˆ)/2) scales the quadrature operators as Sˆ†qˆSˆ → γqˆ
and Sˆ†pˆSˆ → pˆ/γ, where γ = er. Linear coefficients
of xˆi and pˆi in the nullifiers will be altered but the
measurement basis remains the same. A Fourier oper-
ator Fˆ (θ) = exp(−iθ(qˆ2 + pˆ2)/2) transforms the quadra-
ture operators as Fˆ †qˆFˆ = cos θqˆ + sin θpˆ and Fˆ †pˆFˆ =
− sin θqˆ+ cos θpˆ. The Fourier operator changes the local
measurement bases for the quantum correlation.
III. CC QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
In the CC setting of QSS, the dealer is connected to
the n parties through secure quantum channels. A classi-
cal secret value s is encoded by displacing certain modes
i of the cluster state by some function fi(s). The value
of fi(s), the strength of the CPHASE Aij , and the neigh-
bours of the cluster N are designed for specific access
and adversary structure. A CV cluster state can be used
for CC QSS if for each access structure, there is a nul-
lifier containing s and the local quadrature operators of
only that access structure, i.e., there exists real numbers
li such that
N∑
i
liNˆi =
∑
j∈A
kjMˆj + g(s) , (11)
where kj are real numbers; Mˆj are linear combinations
of the local quadrature operators of an access structure
party; g(s) is a nontrivial function of s. On the other
hand, every adversary structure cannot construct a nul-
lifier containing s and only their local operators.
In the case of infinitely squeezing, the access struc-
ture can obtain g(s), and thus s, by locally measuring
their modes according to Mˆj . The scheme is secure if
the reduced Wigner function of the adversary structure
is independent of s.
In the case of finitely squeezing, the access structure
also measures according to Mˆj. Their results are merely
strongly correlated to s, while some information about
the secret is leaked to the adversary structure due to
the weak correlation. The security of the QSS scheme
can be analysed by comparing the amount of informa-
tion obtained by the access structure and the adversary
structure.
The information obtained by the access structure is
quantified by the mutual information, I(D : A), between
the dealer and the access structure [30]. Let the dealer
chooses a secret value s following a probability PD(s).
The access structure would not obtain exactly the same
value due to the finite squeezing. The probability of
obtaining a result s′ follows a probability distribution
PA|D(s, s′), while the total probability, PA(s′), of the ac-
cess structure’s result is given by
PA(s′) =
∫
PD(s)PA|D(s, s′)ds . (12)
The mutual information I(D : A) is defined as [30]
I(D : A) = H(A)−H(A|D) , (13)
whereH(A) is the entropy of the access structure’s result,
which is defined as
H(A) = −
∫
PA(s′) logPA(s′)ds′ , (14)
and H(A|D) is the entropy of access structure condi-
tioned on knowing s, which is defined as [30]
H(A|D) = −
∫
PD(s)PA|D(s, s′) logPA|D(s, s′)dsds′ .
(15)
On the other hand, the adversary structure can unite
their modes through ideal quantum channels, and can
conduct any operation allowed by physics. The amount
of information leaked to the adversary structure, I(D :
E), is capped by the Holevo bound χ [30, 31], i.e.,
I(D : E) ≤ χ = S(ρˆE)−
∫
PD(s)S(ρˆE|D(s))ds , (16)
5where S(ρˆ) is the von Neumann entropy; ρˆE|D(s) is the
state obtained by the adversary structure if s is prepared
by the dealer; ρˆE is the average state obtained by the
adversary structure, viz.
ρˆE =
∫
PD(s)ρˆE|D(s)ds . (17)
As CV cluster states are Gaussian, the reduced state
of the adversary structure is also Gaussian. The von
Neumann entropy of Gaussian states can be calculated
by using their covariance matrix V , which is defined as
Vij := 〈{∆xi,∆xj}〉/2 [18]. If the Wigner function of
an r-mode Gaussian state is known, V can be obtained
through the relation [18]
W (xˆ) =
exp(−1/2(x− x¯)TV −1(x− x¯))
(2pi)r
√
detV
, (18)
where x = (q1, p1, . . . , qr, pr)
T . Covariance matrices
can be characterised by their symplectic spectrum {νk},
which is equal to the eigenspectrum of the matrix |iΩV |
[18], where
Ωi,j =
{ 1 if i = 2k − 1, j = 2k ,
−1 if i = 2k, j = 2k − 1 ,
0 else,
(19)
for k = 1, . . . , r. The von Neumann entropy is calculated
using
S(ρˆ) =
r∑
i
g(νk) , (20)
where
g(ν) :=
(
ν +
1
2
)
log
(
ν +
1
2
)
−
(
ν − 1
2
)
log
(
ν − 1
2
)
.
(21)
In the case that the covariance matrices of ρˆE and
ρˆE|D are independent of s, their respective von Neumann
entropies are also so. Then the Holevo bound can be
simplified as,
I(D : E) ≤ S(ρˆE)− S(ρˆE|D) . (22)
The minimum secret sharing rate in each round of the
protocol is thus
Kcc = I(D : A)− I(D : E) . (23)
With the strongly correlated random numbers s and s′,
and the expected amount of secret information,Kcc, a se-
cure key can be distilled to encode and share the classical
secret [32].
As examples, Kcc for the (2,3)- and the (3,5)-protocol
are calculated. Readers who are mainly interested in the
general formalism of QSS can skip the examples.
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FIG. 1: Schematic representation of the cluster states for the
(2,3)-protocol (left), and the (3,5)-protocol (right). Each oval
represents a squeezed mode, which will be distributed to the
party, denoted by the label inside the ovals. The subscript of
each mode denotes the squeezing parameter and the displace-
ment before the CPHASE operation. The edges joining
modes represent CPHASE operations with the strength
denoted by the edges’ label.
A. Example 1 of CC Quantum secret sharing:
(2,3)-protocol
In a (2,3)-CC protocol, the access structure is any two
of the three parties collaborating, while the adversary
structure is any collaboration with only one party. The
(2,3)-CC protocol can be implemented by a linear three-
mode cluster, as shown in Fig. 1. We assume the dealer
picks the secret classical value s following a Gaussian
probability distribution with a width Σ, i.e.,
PD(s) = 1√
piΣ
e−s
2/Σ2 . (24)
The state is encoded by displacing mode 2 by is/
√
2 and
mode 3 by −is/√2. In the infinitely squeezing case, the
nullifiers of the CV cluster state are
Nˆ1 = pˆ1− qˆ2− qˆ3 ; Nˆ2 = pˆ2− qˆ1+ s ; Nˆ3 = pˆ3− qˆ1− s .
(25)
1. Parties {1, 2} collaborating
Consider parties 1 and 2 are the access structure. If
the cluster state is infinitely squeezed, the shared secret is
the difference between pˆmeasurement outcome of party 1
and qˆ measurement outcome of party 2, i.e., s = q1 − p2
according to Nˆ2. Deriving from Eq. (8), the reduced
Wigner function of party 3 is a constant function inde-
pendent of s, thus the protocol is secure. In the finitely
squeezing case, the Wigner function is given by Eq. (7)
with the nullifiers in Eq. (25). For simplicity, we assume
the modes are equally squeezed, i.e., σi = σ for all i, but
our analysis is applicable for inhomogeneous σi.
The measurement basis of the parties is the same as
the infinitely squeezing case. The classical probability of
the measurement results p2 and q1 is
P(s)A|D;{1,2}(q1, p2) =
1
pi
e−(p2−q1−s)
2/σ2e−σ
2q21 , (26)
6which is obtained by tracing out q1, p2, and the contri-
butions of party 3 in the Wigner function. The proba-
bility distribution of the difference of the measurements,
s′ = q1−p2, can be obtained by tracing out an orthogonal
quantity, e.g. (p1 + q2)/2, then we get
PA|D;{1,2}(s, s′) = 1√
piσ
exp
(
− (s− s
′)2
σ2
)
, (27)
and thus
PA;{1,2}(s′) = 1√
pi
√
σ2 +Σ2
e−s
′2/(σ2+Σ2) . (28)
The mutual information between the dealer and the ac-
cess structure can then be calculated using Eq. (13).
We now consider the adversary structure. The reduced
Wigner function of ρˆE and ρˆE|D(s) are
WE|D;{3} =
σ2
pi
√
1 + σ4
e
− σ
2((p3−s)
2+q23(1+σ
4))
1+σ4 ; (29)
WE;{3} =
∫
WE|D;{3}ds
=
σ2
pi
√
1 + σ4 + σ2Σ2
e
−σ2
(
q23+
p23
1+σ4+σ2Σ2
)
.(30)
The covariance matrices of these states are
VE|D;{3} =
( 1
2σ2 0
0 1+σ
4
2σ2
)
, VE;{3} =
( 1
2σ2 0
0 1+σ
4+σ2Σ2
2σ2
)
,
(31)
where the symplectic eigenvalues are νE|D;{3} =√
1 + σ4/2σ2 and νE;{3} =
√
1 + σ4 + σ2Σ2/2σ2, respec-
tively. The Holevo bound can then be calculated using
Eq. (20) and (22), and hence the secret sharing rate can
be obtained from Eq. (23).
Because both party 2 and 3 hold the end mode of the
cluster state, the structure of their local states is the
same, i.e., all Wigner functions will be the same as above
except replacing the subscript 2 by 3 and s by −s. The
security for party {1, 3} collaboration can be analysed
by similar procedure as the {1, 2} collaboration, and the
secret sharing in both collaborations will be the same.
2. Parties {2,3} collaborating
Consider parties 2 and 3 are now the access structure.
In the infinitely squeezed case, because the operator Nˆ2−
Nˆ3 = pˆ2 − pˆ3 + 2s is also a nullifier, the secret s can be
obtained if both parties conduct pˆ measurement, i.e., s =
(−p2+p3)/2. The protocol is secure because the reduced
Wigner function of party 1 is a constant independent of
s.
In the finitely squeezed case, the measurement results
of pˆ1 and pˆ2 follow a probability distribution
P(s)A|D;{2,3}(p1, p2) =
1
pi
√
2 + σ4
exp
(
− (p2 − p3 + 2s)
2
σ2(2 + σ4)
)
×e−σ2((p2+s)2+(p3−s)2)/(2+σ4) . (32)
The first exponent accounts for the strong correlations
while the last exponent is higher order weak correlations.
The quantity s′ = (−p2 + p3)/2 follows the probability
PA|D;{2,3}(s, s′) = 1√
2piσ
exp
(
− 2(s− s
′)2
σ2
)
, (33)
and thus
PA;{2,3}(s′) =
√
2
pi(σ2 + 2Σ2)
exp
(
− 2s
′2
σ2 + 2Σ2
)
. (34)
For the adversary structure party 1, the reduced
Wigner function of ρˆE|D;{1} is
WE|D;{1} =
σ2
pi
√
2 + σ4
e
−σ2
(
q21+
p21
2+σ4
)
. (35)
Because Eq. (35) is independent of s, the Wigner func-
tion of ρˆE;{1} and ρˆE|D;{1} would be the same, i.e.,
WE|D;{1} = WE;{1}. Therefore the Holevo bound van-
ishes and party 1 cannot get any information, and hence
the secret sharing rate is simply I(D : A).
B. Example 2 of CC Quantum secret sharing:
(3,5)-protocol
In a (3,5)-CC protocol, the access structure is any
three of the five parties collaborating, while the adver-
sary structure is any collaboration with less than three
parties. The (3,5)-CC protocol can be implemented by
a star-shaped five mode cluster, as shown in Fig. 1. All
five modes of the cluster state are displaced by −is/√2,
where the classical secret s is assumed to be chosen ac-
cording to the probability distribution given in Eq. (24).
In the infinitely squeezing case, the nullifiers of the CV
cluster state are given by
Nˆi = pˆi − qˆi+1 − qˆi−1 − s , (36)
where i+ 1 = 1 when i = 5; i− 1 = 5 when i = 1.
Ten different combinations of access structure can be
formed in this protocol, but they can be categorised into
two classes of collaborations, which are three neighbour-
ing parties, and two neighbours with one disjoint party.
Without loss of generality, we consider parties {1,2,3} as
an example of three neighbours collaboration, and parties
{1,3,4} for two neighbours collaboration. The security
proof and secret sharing rate of these two cases can be
adapted to other collaborations after indices changing.
1. Parties {1,2,3} collaborating
Consider parties 1, 2, and 3 are the access structure. In
the infinitely squeezing case, the secret s can be obtained
if both parties 1 and 3 measure qˆ and party 2 measures
pˆ, i.e., s = −q1+p2−q3 according to Nˆ2 in Eq. (36). The
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is a constant function after tracing out the contributions
of the access structure in Eq. (8).
In the finitely squeezing case, the probability mea-
surement by parties {1,2,3} is determined by the re-
duced Wigner function WA|D;{1,2,3}(q1, p1, q2, p2, q3, p3)
after tracing out the contributions of parties 4 and 5. As
the measurement bases are qˆ2, pˆ1, and qˆ3, the measure-
ment probability is obtained by tracing out the depen-
dence of p1, q2, and p3 from the reduced Wigner func-
tion. The probability distribution of the received secret,
s′ = p2 − q1 − q3, can be obtained by first substituting
the set of variables (q1, p2, q3) by another linearly inde-
pendent set of variables (q1, s
′, q3), and then tracing out
q1 and q3. The Jacobian matrix of this variable trans-
formation is 1, so the form of probability distribution
remains the same [33].
The tracing processes described above involves differ-
ent physical meanings, but the end result is that all con-
tributions except s′ are traced out. So the probability
distribution of s′ can be obtained in only two steps: first
substituting p2 = s
′ + q1 + q3 in the total Wigner func-
tion, and then tracing out all variables except s′. In this
case, we get
PA|D;{1,2,3}(s, s′) = 1√
piσ
exp
(
− (s− s
′)2
σ2
)
, (37)
and thus
PA;{1,2,3}(s′) = 1√
pi
√
σ2 +Σ2
e−s
′2/(σ2+Σ2) . (38)
For the adversary structure parties 4 and 5, the re-
duced Wigner function of WE|D;{4,5} and WE;{4,5} can
be obtained by tracing out the contribution of parties
1,2,3. The covariance matrices of these states are
VE|D;{4,5} =


1
2σ2 0 0
1
2σ2
0 1σ2 +
σ2
2
1
2σ2 0
0 12σ2
1
2σ2 0
1
2σ2 0 0
1
σ2 +
σ2
2

 ,(39)
VE;{4,5} =


1
2σ2 0 0
1
2σ2
0 1σ2 +
σ2+Σ2
2
1
2σ2 0
0 12σ2
1
2σ2 0
1
2σ2 0 0
1
σ2 +
σ2+Σ2
2

 ,(40)
where the symplectic spectrum are νE|D;{4,5} =
{√1 + σ4/2σ2,√1 + σ4/2σ2} and νE;{4,5} =
{√1 + σ4/2σ2,√1 + σ4 + 2σ2Σ2/2σ2}. The von
Neumann entropy can then be calculated using Eq. (20),
and the secret sharing rate is calculated from Eq. (23).
2. Parties {1,3,4} collaborating
Consider now that parties 1, 3, and 4 are the access
structure. In the infinitely squeezing case, the secret s
can be obtained when party 1 measures pˆ, party 3 and
4 measures pˆ′ = (pˆ − qˆ)/√2. Because Nˆ1 − Nˆ3 − Nˆ4 is
a nullifier, their measurement results are correlated as
−p1 +
√
2p′3 +
√
2p′4 = s. The reduced Wigner function
of parties {2,5} collaboration is a constant function, so
the secret sharing is secure.
In the finitely squeezing case, the probability distri-
bution of the quantity s′ = −p1 + p3 − q3 + p4 − q4
can be obtained by first substituting the set of vari-
ables (q1, p1, q3, p3, q4, p4) with the new set of variables
(q1, s
′, q3, p3, q4, p4). The determinant of the Jacobian
matrix of this transformation is 1. All variables except
s′ are traced out from the reduced Wigner function, then
we get
PA|D;{1,3,4}(s, s′) = 1√
3piσ
exp
(
− (s− s
′)2
3σ2
)
, (41)
and thus
PA;{1,3,4}(s′) = 1√
pi
√
3σ2 +Σ2
e−s
′2/(3σ2+Σ2) . (42)
For the adversary structure parties 2 and 5, the covari-
ance matrices of the states ρˆE|D;{2,5} and ρˆE;{2,5} are
VE|D;{2,5} =


1
2σ2 0 0 0
0 1σ2 +
σ2
2 0
1
2σ2
0 0 12σ2 0
0 12σ2 0
1
σ2 +
σ2
2

 ,(43)
VE;{2,5} =


1
2σ2 0 0 0
0 1σ2 +
σ2
2 +
Σ2
2 0
1
2σ2 +
Σ2
2
0 0 12σ2 0
0 12σ2 +
Σ2
2 0
1
σ2 +
σ2
2 +
Σ2
2

 .(44)
The symplectic spectrum are νE|D;{2,5} =
{√1 + σ4/2σ2,√3 + σ4/2σ2} and νE;{2,5} =
{√1 + σ4/2σ2,√3 + σ4 + 2σ2Σ2/2σ2}, respectively.
The von Neumann entropy can then be calculated by
Eq. (20), and hence the secret sharing rate by Eq. (23).
3. Results
The secret sharing rate for the (2,3)- and (3,5)-
protocols is plotted against σ in Fig 2. Apart from the
{2, 3} in (2,3)-protocol that can completely remove the
entanglement from the adversary structure, CC QSS is
secure unless the squeezing parameter is larger than some
threshold limit. The threshold for both protocols we con-
sidered are around σ ≈ 1. This suggests a CC QSS can
be implemented with modest technological requirement.
On the contrary to common beliefs that a CV state
with σ = 1 cannot transmit secure information, we note
that the CC secret sharing rate is non-zero in some sce-
narios even when σ ≥ 1. The result is not surprising
in cluster state QSS, because implementing a CPHASE
8FIG. 2: Secret sharing rate of CC QSS protocols using CV
cluster states with different squeezing parameters σ. The vari-
ance of the classical secret probability is chosen as Σ = 1. Left
panel: (2,3) protocol for {2,3} collaboration (solid line) and
{1,3} collaboration (dashed line). Left panel: (3,5) protocol
for {1,2,3} collaboration (solid line) and {1,3,4} collaboration
(dashed line).
requires the initial modes to be squeezed. In fact, a two-
mode cluster state can be easily showed to be local uni-
tarily equivalent to a finitely-squeezed EPR state unless
σ →∞.
Surprisingly, although any access structure collabora-
tion can obtain s in infinitely squeezing case, different
collaborations obtain different security rate in the finitely
squeezing case. The unequal secret sharing rate is re-
lated to the entanglement structure of the cluster state.
In practice, the dealer has to consider the disadvantage
of certain collaborations when applying CC QSS.
IV. CQ QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
In the CQ setting of QSS, the dealer is connected to the
parties through insecure quantum channels, so the unau-
thorised parities can manipulate all the modes sent from
the dealer. The CC protocol mentioned in Sec. III is
insecure in this setting, because the adversary structure
can capture and measure the modes to obtain s. This
eavesdropping can be intractable if the adversary struc-
ture resends to the access structure an infinitely squeezed
state with the same s encoded, so the access structure
with have the same measurement result as the adversary
structure.
Here we modify the CC protocol for the CQ setting.
We first present an entanglement-based protocol, and dis-
cuss how it can be reduced to a mixed-state protocol that
reduces the resource requirement. Instead of construct-
ing an n-mode cluster state and encoding a classical se-
cret s into the state, the dealer prepares an (n+1)-mode
standard cluster state, where n of the modes are deliv-
ered to the parties while the dealer keeps the remaining
one, denoted as mode D. A good CQ protocol should
produce quantum correlation between the dealer and the
access structure much stronger than that between the
dealer and the unauthorised parties.
Here we make two assumptions to simplify the demon-
stration of the security, but the assumptions will be re-
laxed at the end of this section without compromising the
secret sharing rate. We assume the access structure par-
ties are connected by secure and ideal quantum channels,
so the modes can be sent to one party, say party h, with
perfect fidelity. We also assume both the dealer and the
access structure have quantum memories, so the cluster
states in each round of CQ are stored with perfect fidelity
for subsequent quantum operation and measurement.
The procedure of CQ QSS is outlined as follows. In
each round of CQ QSS, an entangled state is shared be-
tween the dealer and the access structure. Consider that
the strong correlation is represented by the two nullifiers,
pˆD − QˆA and qˆD − PˆA, which are linear combinations of
the standard nullifiers. QˆA and PˆA are linear combina-
tions of only the access structure parties’ local qˆ and pˆ
operators. By applying a global operation, UˆA, on all the
modes at party h, QˆA and PˆA are transformed to qˆh and
pˆh. As a result, the strong correlations with mode D are
transferred to mode h.
After all the rounds of cluster state distribution, the
stage of parameter-estimation ensues. The dealer or
party h randomly selects half of the shared modes for
measurement, and the selection is announced. Both the
dealer and party h measures the selected modes in ei-
ther the xˆ and pˆ basis. The measurement outcomes are
announced for characterising the unmeasured states.
In the infinitely squeezing case, the estimated parame-
ters should indicate that the state between mode D and
mode h is maximally entangled. [48] The dealer and
party h measure each residual modes randomly in ei-
ther the qˆ or pˆ basis, the basis is then announced. Each
measurement outcome is a random number on the real
axis, and the outcomes are the same if the measurement
bases are matching, i.e., one party measures in qˆ while
the other measures in pˆ. The common random numbers
can be used as secure keys to encode the secrets. Be-
cause the state was maximally entangled, no information
is leaked to unauthorised parties.
In the finitely squeezing case, although mode D and
mode h are strongly correlated, the state of adversary
structure is still weakly correlated with mode D. As
to be discussed, local quantum operation is applied on
each residual mode to rectify the covariance of the state
according to the estimated parameters. The dealer and
party h then measure each mode in either the xˆ or pˆ basis,
and announce the basis. Unlike the infinitely squeezed
case, post-processing is required to distill secure keys
from the correlated measurement outcomes due to two
reasons. First, even if the measurement basis is match-
ing, the measurement outcomes of the dealer and the
access structure are merely strongly correlated but not
exactly equal. Besides, partial information about the
outcomes is leaked to unauthorised parties due to the
9non-uniform distribution of the measurement outcomes
and the weak entanglement between the unauthorised
parties’ and the dealer’s modes.
In the following, we employ the security analysis tech-
niques from CV-QKD [34] to estimate the minimal rate
of secure key distilled from each cluster state, and hence
the secret sharing rate in each round of CQ QSS.
A. Equivalence of CQ Quantum secret sharing and
QKD
We now show why CQ QSS and CV-QKD can be anal-
ysed using the same techniques. Consider before the
CPHASE operation, mode D is squeezed with σD while
all other modes are squeezed with σ. Assume the mode
D is connected to N neighbours after the cluster state
formation, the reduced Wigner function of mode D is
WD(qD, pD) =
σσDe
−σ2Dq2D
pi
√
N + σ2σ2D
exp
(
− p
2
D
σ2D +N/σ
2
)
.
(45)
WD is the same as the reduced Wigner function of a two-
mode cluster state |CN 〉, where mode D is connected to a
mode u that is squeezed with σ/
√
N . Because both the
CQ cluster state and |CN 〉 are pure, the amount of en-
tanglement between the modeD and the delivered modes
is the same as the entanglement between the modes in
|CN 〉.
As in the common security analysis of QKD, we grant
the unauthorised parties the full power to manipulate the
modes sent from the dealer. Then there will be no dif-
ference for the dealer to prepare the CQ cluster state or
|CN 〉, because the unauthorised party can transform the
delivered cluster state modes to mode u or vice versa.
Then our CQ state delivery is equivalent to the follow-
ing scenario: The dealer first prepares |CN〉 and deliv-
ers mode u through an insecure quantum channel. The
unauthorised parties capture mode u, entangle it with
ancillae, and forward some modes to the access struc-
ture.
The access structure’s modes are then gathered at
party h. After the operation UˆA, modes other than mode
h are still weakly correlated with mode D. For simplicity,
these weak correlations are neglected in our analysis, i.e.,
all modes except h are traced out. This action only re-
duces the quantum correlations between the dealer and
the access structure, thus the security is not unphysi-
cally improved. Now the CQ protocol is effectively re-
duced to a CV-QKD protocol: The dealer first prepares
a two-mode Gaussian state, |CN〉, and delivers one mode.
The access structure finally gets a mode h that remains
strongly correlated with mode D, but the quantum cor-
relation is reduced due to the entanglement with the en-
vironment controlled by the unauthorised parties. The
degradation of quantum correlations in the encoding and
decoding processes in CQ QSS can be analogous to the
loss and noise when transmitting an EPR state through
D
D u
D
h
D h
Decoding
Delivered mode
captured by adversary
Tracing out
modes besides h
D
Deliver strong 
correlation to mode h
Local unitary
equivalent
Modes delivery
D u
QSSQKD
Dealer
Unauthorized parties
Authorized parties
FIG. 3: Strategy for computing the secret sharing rate using
CV-QKD techniques. Strongly (weakly) correlated modes are
linked by solid (dotted) lines. The procedure of CQ QSS
is shown on the right while that of QKD is shown on the
left. The key idea is that both QKD and QSS have the same
initial (pure entangled state with parts delivered) and final
resources (strongly correlated state between the dealer and
the authorised parties.)
an imperfect channel in QKD. The whole idea is sum-
marised schematically in Fig. 3.
B. Secret sharing rate
In the unified picture of CV-QKD, a finitely squeezed
two-mode squeezed state is prepared by the dealer and
delivered to the authorised party through an imperfect
channel [18, 35]. Both parties measure some of the deliv-
ered states to estimate the covariance matrix, V , of the
unmeasured states. Using the fact that Gaussian states
minimise the distilled secure key rate for every state shar-
ing the same V [35, 36], assuming the unmeasured states
being Gaussian upper-bounds the information leakage to
unauthorised parties. Because a Gaussian state is com-
pletely characterised by its covariance matrix, the secure
key rate can be deduced from only V . For realistic chan-
nels that are usually symmetrical for quadratures xˆ and
pˆ, V can be expressed in a standardised form as
V =
(
V I cZ
cZ V ′I
)
, (46)
where I and Z are the 2×2 identity and Pauli Z matrices
respectively; V is the variance of the undelivered mode
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of the dealer; V ′ is the variance of the mode received
by the authorised party; c is the correlation between the
two modes. V can be characterised by only V and two
channel parameters, the transmittance, τ , and the noise,
χ, which are defined by the relations
c =
√
τ(V 2 − 1
4
) ; V ′ = τ(V + χ) . (47)
To estimate the minimal secret sharing rate of the CQ
QSS, in the parameter-estimation stage the dealer and
the access structure construct the covariance matrix by
measuring some of their modes. A quantum operation is
then applied on the unmeasured modes to transform their
covariance matrix to the standard form, from where the
analogous τ and χ can be extracted according to Eq. (46).
For the pedagogic purpose, we demonstrate in Sec. IVC
and IVD the procedure of getting the standardised co-
variance matrix for different collaborations in the (2,3)-
and (3,5)-CQ protocols respectively. Readers who are
mainly interested in the general formalism can skip the
examples.
We assume our protocol is direct reconciliation, i.e.,
the measurement result of the dealer is the secret value
that has to be estimated by the access structure, but the
secret sharing rate of a reverse reconciliation protocol can
be easily calculated by similar procedure [34]. The secret
sharing rate, KCQ, is given by [34]
KCQ = I(D : A)− I(D : E) , (48)
where I(D : A) is the mutual information between the
dealer and access structure; the information obtained
by unauthorised parties is given by I(D : E), which is
capped by the Holevo bound.
The mutual information I(D : A) can be calculated
by comparing the variance of mode h with and without
knowing the measurement results of mode D. In terms
of the analogous channel parameters, the mutual infor-
mation is given by [34]
I(D : A) =
1
2
log
( V + χ
χ+ 14V
)
. (49)
In direct reconciliation protocols, the Holevo bound of
the unauthorised parities’ information is defined as
I(D : E) = S(E)− S(E|D) , (50)
where S(E) is the von Neumann entropy of unauthorised
parties’ state, S(E|D) is the conditional von Neumann
entropy if the measurement result of the dealer is known.
As the unauthorised parties can control the environment
that purifies the whole system, the entropy of the unau-
thorised parties is the same as that of the system DA,
i.e., S(E) = S(DA). The entropy can be calculated us-
ing Eq. (20) as S(DA) = g(ν+) + g(ν−) [18], where the
symplectic spectrum of V , {ν+, ν−}, is given by
ν± =
1
2
(√
(V + V ′)2 − 4c2 ± (V − V ′)
)
. (51)
σ
σ
1
σ
2 3
σ
σ
1
σ
5 2
σ
σ
4 3
σd
D
σd
D
-1
FIG. 4: Schematic representation of the cluster state for the
(2,3) CQ protocol (left), and the (3,5) CQ protocol (right).
All of the modes are not displaced before the CPHASE op-
eration. The strength of unlabelled edges is A = 1.
Similarly, because the state of system AE is pure after
system D is measured, the conditional entropy S(E|D)
is the same as S(A|D). The covariance matrix of system
A after the measurement of the dealer is given by [37, 38]
VA|D =
(
V − c2/V 0
0 V ′
)
, (52)
where the symplectic eigenvalue is
νc =
√
V ′
(
V ′ − c
2
V
)
= τ
√
(V + χ)
(
1
V
+ χ
)
. (53)
Hence we get S(E|D) = g(νc).
With the strongly correlated measurement outcomes
and the expected amount of secret information, KCQ,
the dealer and the access structure can collaborate to
distill secure key to encode the classical secret [32].
C. Example 1 of CQ Quantum secret sharing:
(2,3)-protocol
In a (2,3)-CQ protocol, any two of the three parties
can form a strong correlation with the dealer, while any
one party is only weakly correlated with the dealer. The
protocol can be implemented by a diamond-shaped CV
cluster state with AD3 = A13 = A12 = 1 and AD2 = −1,
as shown in Fig. 4. We note that the diamond-shaped
CV cluster state is also a form of error correction of a
CV cluster state [20]. In the infinitely squeezing case,
the nullifiers are
NˆD = pˆD + qˆ2 − qˆ3 ; Nˆ1 = pˆ1 − qˆ2 − qˆ3
Nˆ2 = pˆ2 + qˆD − qˆ1 ; Nˆ3 = pˆ3 − qˆD − qˆ1 . (54)
The finitely squeezed state is described by Eq. (7) with
the above nullifiers.
The access structure can be composed by parties {1, 2},
{1, 3}, and {2, 3}. The entanglement structure possessed
by collaborations {1, 2} and {1, 3} are equivalent, be-
cause the nullifiers of {1, 2} will be the same as that of
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{1, 3} if the dealer applies a pi-phase operation, Fˆ (pi), to
his mode. On the other hand, the collaboration {2, 3}
possesses a different entanglement structure.
1. Parties {1,2} collaboration
If parties {1, 2} are the access structure, the strong
correlations are specified by the nullifiers
NˆD − Nˆ1 = pˆD − pˆ1 + 2qˆ2 and Nˆ2 = qˆD − qˆ1 + pˆ2 .(55)
A global operation is applied on the access structure’s
mode to transfer the strong correlation to mode 2, i.e.,
mode 2 is treated as mode h. The transformation can be
implemented by various sequence of operations, but the
final measurement results and the covariance matrix are
not affected. One possible choice is the {1,2} Decoding
Sequence: (i) apply exp(−iqˆ1qˆ2); (ii) then exp(ipˆ1pˆ2);
(iii) finally Fˆ2(pi).
After tracing out the modes other than mode D and
mode 2, the covariance matrix of the resultant state ρˆDA
is given by
VDA;{1,2} =


1
2σ2D
0 0 1
2σ2D
0 1σ2 +
σ2D
2
1
σ2 0
0 1σ2
1
σ2 +
σ2
2 0
1
2σ2D
0 0 σ
2
2 +
1
2σ2D

 .
(56)
The covariance matrix will be revealed in the parameter-
estimation stage when half of the states are measured.
As VDA;{1,2} is not in the standard form, i.e., Eq. (46),
rectifying quantum operations are applied onto the resid-
ual states. First of all, the variance of qˆD and pˆD are
balanced by squeezing mode D with the squeezing pa-
rameter
γD =
√
σD
σ
√
2 + σ2σ2D . (57)
Next, mode 2 is squeezed to balance the coherent terms,
i.e., 〈∆qˆD∆pˆ2〉 and 〈∆pˆD∆qˆ2〉. The squeezing parameter
is given by
γ2 =
√
2σD
σ
√
2 + σ2σ2D
. (58)
In practice, both γD and γ2 can be obtained from the re-
sults in parameter-estimation stage, i.e., without know-
ing the squeezing parameter of the initial cluster state.
This squeezing stage will transform the state ρˆDA as
ρˆDA → ρˆ′DA = SˆD(γD)Sˆ2(γ2)ρˆDASˆ†2(γ2)Sˆ†D(γD) , (59)
where the covariance matrix becomes
V ′DA;{1,2} =


V(2,3) 0 0 c
0 V(2,3) c 0
0 c V ′q 0
c 0 0 V ′p

 , (60)
for V(2,3) =
√
2 + σ2σ2D/2σσD ; c = 1/
√
2σσD; the vari-
ance of mode 2 is
V ′q =
1 + σ2σ2D
σσD
√
2 + σ2σ2D
; V ′p =
(2 + σ4)
√
2 + σ2σ2D
4σσD
.
(61)
We note that γD and V(2,3) are the same for any col-
laboration in the (2,3)-protocol, because mode D is kept
with the dealer that is not affected by operations on de-
livered modes. The disparity between V ′q and V
′
p implies
imbalanced noise for the quadratures qˆ2 and pˆ2. As the
aim of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of per-
forming CQ QSS using CV cluster states, we balance
the variances of qˆ2 and pˆ2 by a ‘state-averaging’ process,
which would nonetheless sacrifice some quantum corre-
lations. Consider the dealer randomly divides the un-
measured states into two sets, and the choice of division
is announced. In one set, the dealer applies a Fourier
operator, FˆD(−pi/2), on each mode that transforms the
quadrature operators as qˆD → pˆD and pˆD → −qˆD. In
the other set, party 2 applies FˆD(−pi/2) on each mode
that causes the transformation qˆ2 → pˆ2 and pˆ2 → −qˆ2.
After that, the choice of division is discarded. The state
will be transformed as
ρˆ′DA → ρˆ′′DA =
1
2
FˆD(−pi/2)ρˆ′DAFˆ †D(−pi/2)
+
1
2
Fˆ2(−pi/2)ρˆ′DAFˆ †2 (−pi/2) . (62)
The covariance matrix of ρˆ′′DA is given by
V ′′DA;{1,2} =


V(2,3) 0 c 0
0 V(2,3) 0 −c
c 0 VA;{1,2} 0
0 −c 0 VA;{1,2}

 , (63)
where VA;{1,2} = (V ′q + V
′
p)/2 with the definition in
Eq. (61). Finally, the modes are measured by the dealer
and party 2 in either the qˆ or pˆ basis. The variances of
the measurement results will be given by Eq. (63).
We note that ρˆ′′DA is not a Gaussian state because the
stage-averaging process in Eq. (62) is not a Gaussian op-
eration. To calculate the secret sharing rate using the
techniques in Sec. IVB, we assume the measurement re-
sults originates from a Gaussian state ρˆG where its covari-
ance matrix is V . According to Ref.s [35, 36], Gaussian
states minimise the secure key rate for all states with the
same covariance matrix. Therefore our action maximises
the power of the unauthorised parties and lower-bounds
the secret sharing rate.
By comparing Eq. (63) with Eq. (46), the variance of
the dealer’s mode is V = V(2,3), and the analogous chan-
nel parameters can be deduced as τ = c2/(V 2(2,3)−1/4) =
1 and χ = VA;{1,2} − V(2,3). The minimal secret sharing
rate can then be calculated by Eqs. (48-51) and (53).
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2. Parties {2,3} collaboration
If parties {2, 3} are the access structure, the strong
correlations are specified by the nullifiers
NˆD = pˆD+ qˆ2− qˆ3 and Nˆ2 − Nˆ3
2
= qˆD+
pˆ2
2
− pˆ3
2
. (64)
The quantum correlation can be transferred to mode 2
by the {2,3} Decoding Sequence, which is simply a 50:50
beam splitter that transforms aˆ2 → −(aˆ2 + aˆ3)/
√
2 and
aˆ3 → (aˆ2 − aˆ3)/
√
2. The resultant covariance matrix
between mode D and mode 2 becomes
VDA;{2,3} =


1
2σ2D
0 0 1√
2σ2D
0 1σ2 +
σ2D
2
1√
2σ2
0
0 1√
2σ2
1
2σ2 0
1√
2σ2D
0 0 σ
2
2 +
1
σ2D

 .
(65)
The secure sharing rate can be deduced by similar pro-
cess as in the {1, 2} collaboration: squeezing and trans-
forming local modes to construct a state with standard-
ised covariance matrix, and then measuring the states
to obtain the analogous channel parameters for comput-
ing the information of different parties. However, the
{2, 3} collaboration is special as the dealer and party 2
are actually holding a pure state, i.e., the beam splitter
has removed all entanglement from the unauthorised par-
ties. This can be seen from the symplectic spectrum of
Eq. (65), ν{2,3} = {1/2, 1/2}, so the entropy of the system
DA vanishes, i.e., S(DA) = 0. Therefore the unautho-
rised parties cannot obtain any information about the
secret by entangling their modes to the dealer’s mode.
The secret sharing rate is hence the same as the mutual
information between the dealer and the access structure,
which is given by
I(D : A) = log(2V(2,3)) . (66)
D. Example 2 of CQ Quantum secret sharing:
(3,5)-protocol
In a (3,5)-CQ protocol, any three of the five parties can
form a strong correlation with the dealer, while any col-
laboration with less than two parties is only weakly corre-
lated with the dealer. The protocol can be implemented
by a pentagonal CV cluster state, as shown in Fig. 4,
where each connected vertex is entangled by a CPHASE
operation with Aij = 1. In the infinitely squeezing case,
the nullifiers are
NˆD = pˆD −
5∑
i=1
qˆi ; Nˆi = pˆi − qˆi+1 − qˆi−1 − qˆD , (67)
where i + 1 = 1 when i = 5; i − 1 = 5 when i = 1.
The finitely squeezed state is described by the Wigner
function in Eq. (7) with the above nullifiers.
The access structure can be composed by two cate-
gories of collaboration: three neighbouring parties, e.g.
parties {1, 2, 3}, and two neighbours with one disjoint
party, e.g. {1, 3, 4}. The collaborations in each category
hold nullifiers with the same form, so the decoding se-
quence will be the same. If the squeezing parameter is
identical for all five modes, the secret sharing rate of the
collaborations in each category will also be the same.
1. Parties {1,2,3} collaboration
If parties {1, 2, 3} are the access structure, the strong
correlations are specified by the nullifiers
NˆD − Nˆ1 + 2Nˆ2 − Nˆ3 = pˆD − (pˆ1 + 3qˆ1) + (2pˆ2 + qˆ2)
−(pˆ3 + 3qˆ3)
and − Nˆ2 = qˆD − pˆ2 + qˆ1 + qˆ3 . (68)
The quantum correlations can be transferred to party
2 by the {1,2,3} Decoding Sequence: (i) applying
exp(−iqˆ1qˆ2) and exp(−iqˆ2qˆ3); (ii) then exp(ipˆ1pˆ2)
and exp(ipˆ2pˆ3); (iii) finally exp(ipˆ2(2pˆ1 + qˆ1)) and
exp(ipˆ2(2pˆ3 + qˆ3)).
The covariance matrix of the state ρˆDA between mode
D and mode 2 is given by
VDA;{1,2,3} =


1
2σ2D
0 0 1
2σ2D
0
5+σ2σ2D
2σ2
5
2σ2 0
0 52σ2
5+6σ4
2σ2 −σ2
1
2σ2D
0 −σ2 1+σ2σ2D
2σ2D

 . (69)
All terms in VDA;{1,2,3} can be revealed by xˆ and pˆ mea-
surements in the parameter-estimation stage except for
the local coherent terms 〈(∆qˆ2∆pˆ2 +∆pˆ2∆qˆ2)/2〉. How-
ever these terms do not affect the parameters in the
squeezing stage, and will be eventually cancelled during
state-averaging.
The unmeasured states are squeezed locally to balance
the variance of qˆD and pˆD, as well as the coherent terms.
The state is transformed as in Eq. (59), where the pa-
rameters for the {1, 2, 3} collaborations are
γD =
√
σD
σ
√
5 + σ2σ2D ; γ2 =
√
σ
5σD
√
5 + σ2σ2D .
(70)
The covariance matrix of the transformed state is given
by
V ′DA;{1,2,3} =


V(3,5) 0 0 c
0 V(3,5) c 0
0 c V ′q 0
c 0 0 V ′p

 (71)
where V(3,5) =
√
5 + σ2σ2D/2σσD ; c =
√
5/2σσD, and
the variance of mode 2 is given by
V ′q =
(5 + 6σ4)
√
5 + σ2σ2D
10σσD
; V ′q =
5(1 + σ2σ2D)
2σσD
√
5 + σ2σ2D
.
(72)
13
The value of γD and V(3,5) are the same for any collabo-
ration in the (3,5)-protocol.
State-averaging ensues to balance the correlations of
pD − q2 and qD − p2. Half of the unmeasured states
are transformed by FˆD(−pi/2), while the other half are
transformed by Fˆ2(−pi/2). After discarding the choice
of division, the state transforms as Eq. (62), where the
covariance matrix becomes
V ′′DA;{1,2,3} =


V(3,5) 0 c 0
0 V(3,5) 0 −c
c 0 VA;{1,2,3} 0
0 −c 0 VA;{1,2,3}

 ,
(73)
for VA;{1,2,3} = (V ′q+V
′
p)/2 with the definition in Eq. (72).
We note that the local coherent terms vanish after state-
averaging because their sign in FˆD(−pi/2)ρˆ′DAFˆ †D(−pi/2)
and Fˆ2(−pi/2)ρˆ′DAFˆ †2 (−pi/2) are opposite.
We again assume the measurement results come from
a Gaussian state with the same covariance matrix
V ′′DA;{1,2,3}. The variance of the dealer’s mode is recog-
nised as V = V(3,5), and the analogous channel param-
eters can be deduced as τ = c¯2/(V 2(3,5) − 1/4) = 1 and
χ = VA;{1,2,3} − V(3,5). The minimal secret sharing rate
can then be calculated by Eqs. (48-51) and (53).
2. Parties {1,3,4} collaboration
If parties {1, 3, 4} are the access structure, the strong
correlations are specified by the nullifiers
NˆD − 2Nˆ1 + Nˆ3 + Nˆ4 = pˆD − (2pˆ1 + qˆ1) + (pˆ3 − 2qˆ3)
+(pˆ4 − 2qˆ4)
and Nˆ1 − Nˆ3 − Nˆ4 = qˆD + pˆ1 − (pˆ3 − qˆ3)
−(pˆ4 − qˆ4) . (74)
The quantum correlations can be transferred to mode 1
by the {1,3,4} Decoding Sequence: (i) apply exp(−i(qˆ1+
pˆ3 − qˆ3)) and exp(−i(qˆ1 + pˆ4 − qˆ4)); (ii) followed by
exp(ipˆ1pˆ3) and exp(ipˆ1pˆ4); (iii) then exp(i2pˆ
2
1); (iv) fi-
nally Fˆ (pi).
The covariance matrix of the state ρˆDA between mode
D and mode 1 is given by
VDA;{1,3,4} =


1
2σ2D
0 0 1
2σ2D
0
5+σ2σ2D
2σ2
5
2σ2 0
0 52σ2
5+6σ4
2σ2 −2σ2
1
2σ2D
0 −2σ2 1+3σ2σ2D
2σ2D

 .
(75)
After the parameter-estimation stage, local-squeezing
is applied as in Eq. (59) except mode 1 is now mode h.
The squeezing parameter in the current collaboration is
γD =
√
σD
σ
√
5 + σ2σ2D ; γ1 =
√
σ
5σD
√
5 + σ2σ2D .
(76)
FIG. 5: Secret sharing rate of CQ QSS protocols using CV
cluster states with different squeezing parameters σ. The
squeezing parameter of dealer’s mode is set as σD = σ. Left
panel: (2,3) protocol for {2,3} collaboration (solid line) and
{1,3} collaboration (dashed line). Right panel: (3,5) protocol
for {1,2,3} collaboration (solid line) and {1,3,4} collaboration
(dashed line).
The covariance matrix of the unmeasured states then be-
comes
V ′DA;{1,3,4} =


V(3,5) 0 0 c
0 V(3,5) c 0
0 c V ′q 0
c 0 0 V ′p

 (77)
where c =
√
5/2σσD, and the variance of mode 1 is given
by
V ′q =
(5 + 6σ4)
√
5 + σ2σ2D
10σσD
; V ′p =
5(1 + 3σ2σ2D)
2σσD
√
5 + σ2σ2D
.
(78)
State-averaging ensues to balance the correlations of
pD − q1 and qD − p1. The covariance matrix becomes
V ′′DA;{1,3,4} =


V(3,5) 0 c 0
0 V(3,5) 0 −c
c 0 VA;{1,3,4} 0
0 −c 0 VA;{1,3,4}

 ,
(79)
where VA;{1,3,4} = (V ′q + V ′p)/2 with the definition in
Eq. (78). Similar to the {1, 2, 3} collaboration, the lo-
cal coherent terms are eliminated by state-averaging.
After local qˆ and pˆ measurements, we again assume
the results come from a Gaussian state. The variance of
the dealer’s mode is recognized as V = V(3,5), and the
analogous channel parameters can be deduced as τ =
c¯2/(V 2(3,5) − 1/4) = 1 and χ = VA;{1,3,4} − V(3,5).
E. Results
The secret sharing rate of the (2,3)- and (3,5)-CQ pro-
tocol is plotted in Fig. 5 for different σ. As in the
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CC case, secure key can be distilled if the squeezing pa-
rameter is smaller than a threshold limit, except in the
{2, 3} collaboration in (2,3)-protocol that the entangle-
ment of the adversary structure is completely removed.
The threshold values are about σ ≈ 1 in the examples
we consider. Disparity of secure key rate in different
collaborations is also observed in CQ protocols. The se-
cret sharing rate is non-zero in some cases even when
σ ≥ 1. As we have discussed in the CC case, a two-mode
cluster state is still entangled even if the initial state is
not squeezed. The entanglement between the dealer and
party h imposes strong quantum correlations that can
distill secure keys.
F. Simplification
In the above analysis of CQ protocols, we assume an
(n + 1)-mode cluster state has to be created and quan-
tum memory is available to store the delivered modes
until all of the states are received as well as an ideal quan-
tum channel being available between the access structure
parties. Here we show that these requirements can be re-
laxed without compromising the security.
1. Mixed state approach
Because the distributed modes are unaffected by any
local operation of the dealer, the state obtained by
the parties is the same regardless of whether mode D
has been measured. Therefore, instead of preparing an
(n + 1)-mode cluster state |Ψ〉 and measuring mode D
afterwards, the dealer can simulate the consequence of
the measurement by distributing an n-mode state that
is the same as the measured |Ψ〉. Consider if the dealer
intends to measure in the qˆ basis, then the dealer can
instead prepare the pure state (〈s|qD )|Ψ〉, where |s〉qD is
a qˆD eigenstate with the eigenvalue s. Similarly in the pˆ
measurement rounds, the dealer can prepare (〈s|pD )|Ψ〉,
where |s〉pD is the pˆD eigenstate with the eigenvalue s.
Other parties cannot distinguish the mixed state from
|Ψ〉 if s is picked according to the probability distribu-
tions of dealer’s measurement results on |Ψ〉. The prob-
ability distributions are imposed by the Wigner function
in Eq. (45) as
PqD (s) =
∫
WD(s, pD)dpD =
σD√
pi
e−σ
2
Ds
2
; (80)
PpD (s) =
∫
WD(qD, s)dqD =
e
− s2
σ2
D
+N/σ2
√
pi
√
σ2D +N/σ
2
. (81)
In the simulated qˆ measurement rounds, the infinitely
squeezed (〈s|qD )|Ψ〉 is characterised by the nullifiers
Nˆ qi = pˆi −
∑
j∈N
Aij qˆj −AiDs , (82)
where i = 1, . . . , n; AiD = 0 if the mode i is not a
neighbour of mode D. The nullifiers Nˆ qi is the same as
Nˆi except the operator qˆD is replaced by the simulated
measurement outcome s. In the finitely squeezed case,
the state can be characterised by the Wigner function
WqD (q1, p1, . . . , qn, pn), which is obtained by tracing out
pD and replacing all qD by s in the Wigner function of
|Ψ〉. Because WqD is the same as Wc in Eq. (7) with the
nullifiers Nˆ qi , (〈s|qD )|Ψ〉 is a cluster-class state that can
be formed by displacing a finitely squeezed cluster state.
In the simulated pˆ measurement rounds, the infinitely
squeezed (〈s|pD )|Ψ〉 is characterised by the nullifiers
Nˆp1 =
∑
j∈N
AjD qˆj − s ; Nˆpi = Nˆi − Nˆi−1 , (83)
where j = 2, . . . , n. In the finitely squeezed case,
the state can be characterised by the Wigner function
WpD (q1, p1, . . . , qn, pn), which is obtained by tracing out
qD and replacing all pD by s in the Wigner function of
|Ψ〉. However unlike WqD , WpD is not necessarily repre-
sentable by the form of Wc with the nullifiers Nˆ
p
1 , there-
fore (〈s|pD )|Ψ〉 is generally not a cluster-class state. Nev-
ertheless, (〈s|pD )|Ψ〉 is a Gaussian state that can be ef-
ficiently prepared by offline squeezed states and linear
optical elements [20].
2. Classical memory
When estimating the secret sharing rate, we need the
delivered modes to be rectified so the covariance matrix is
in the standard form. The modes are stored in quantum
memories until the covariance matrix is constructed from
parameter-estimation. Here we show that the measure-
ment probability distribution of the transformed state ρˆ′′
can be obtained by: first measuring the original state ρˆ,
and then subjecting the measurement results to classi-
cal manipulations. Therefore the delivered modes can be
measured before the parameter-estimation stage, quan-
tum memory is thus not necessary.
The rectifying process involves two stages: local-
squeezing and state-averaging. After state-averaging,
ρˆ′′ becomes a mixture of FˆD(−pi/2)ρˆ′Fˆ †D(−pi/2) and
Fˆh(−pi/2)ρˆ′Fˆ †h(−pi/2). By definition, the Wigner func-
tion of ρˆ′′, W ′′, can be written as the sum of the Wigner
function of ρˆ′, W ′, as
W ′′(qD, pD, qh, ph) =
1
2
W ′(pD,−qD, qh, ph)
+
1
2
W ′(qD, pD, ph,−qh) .(84)
Consider the dealer measures ρˆ′′ in qˆD and party h
measures in qˆh, the probability of obtaining measurement
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outcomes y1 and y2, P ′′qD,qh(y1, y2), is given by
P ′′qD ,qh(y1, y2) =
∫
W ′′(y1, pD, y2, ph)dpDdph
=
1
2
∫
W ′(pD,−y1, y2, ph)dpDdph
+
1
2
∫
W ′(y1, pD, ph,−y2)dpDdph
=
1
2
P ′pD,qh(−y1, y2) +
1
2
P ′qD ,ph(y1,−y2) ,
(85)
where the last equality involves renaming of variables;
P ′xD,xh is the joint {xˆD, xˆh} measurement probability of
ρˆ′. Similarly, the probability of another strongly corre-
lated measurement, {pˆD, pˆh}, can be expressed as
P ′′pD,ph(y1, y2) =
1
2
P ′qD ,ph(y1, y2) +
1
2
P ′pD ,qh(y1, y2) .
(86)
These two relations indicate that the measurement
probability distributions after state-averaging are not
different from mixing some measurement probability dis-
tributions before state-averaging. Consider the dealer
and party h randomly measure ρˆ′ in xˆ and pˆ basis. Half
of the {qˆD, pˆh} outcomes and half of the {pˆD, qˆh} out-
comes are picked to mimic the {qˆD, qˆh} measurement of
ρˆ′′. For the {qˆD, pˆh} half, all the pˆh outcomes are mul-
tiplied by −1 and then regarded as qˆh outcomes; for the
{pˆD, qˆh} half, all the pˆD outcomes are multiplied by −1
and then regarded as qˆD outcomes. After mixing the two
sets of data, the probability Pm of getting y1, y2 is given
by
Pm(y1, y2) = 1
2
P ′pD,qh(−y1, y2) +
1
2
P ′qD ,ph(y1,−y2) ,
(87)
which is the same as Eq. (85). The {pˆD, pˆh}measurement
probability of ρˆ′′ can be mimicked by similar procedures.
In local-squeezing stage, the dealer and party h ap-
ply local squeezing operations, SˆD(γD) and Sˆh(γh) , to
balance the variance of mode D and the coherent terms.
The Wigner function of the state ρˆ transforms as
W (qD, pD, qh, ph) → W ′(qD, pD, qh, ph)
= W
(
qD
γD
, γDpD,
qh
γh
, γhph
)
.(88)
Consider ρˆ′ is measured in qˆD and pˆh basis, the prob-
ability of obtaining the outcomes y1, y2 is given by
PqD ,ph(y1, y2) → P ′qD ,ph(y1, y2)
=
∫
W
(
y1
γD
, γDpD,
qh
γh
, γhy2
)
dpDdqh
=
γh
γD
PqD ,ph
(
y1
γD
, γhy2
)
, (89)
where P is the probability distribution when measuring
ρˆ. Similarly, the probability distribution of pˆD and qˆh
measurement transforms as
PpD ,qh(y1, y2)→
γD
γh
PpD ,qh(γDy1,
y2
γh
) . (90)
Measurement results of {qˆD, qˆh} and {pˆD, pˆh} are sifted
as they are merely weakly correlated.
In fact, physically squeezing the state is not necessary
because the transformations in Eqs. (89) and (90) can be
conducted by classically scaling the measurement results.
Consider every qˆi measurement results are scaled by 1/γi,
and every pˆi measurement results are scaled by γi. The
old probability, P , of a qˆ measurement result lying in the
range [y, y+ dy], is equal to the new probability, Ps, of a
scaled result in the range of [γy, γy+γdy]. Thus we have
the relation P(y)dy = P ′(γy)γdy for qˆ measurement, and
similarly P(y)dy = P ′(y/γ)dy/γ for pˆ measurement. By
eliminating common factors and redefining variables, we
get
PsqD ,ph(y1, y2) =
γh
γD
PqD,ph
(
y1
γD
, γhy2
)
;
PspD,qh(y1, y2) =
γD
γh
PpD ,qh
(
γDy1,
y2
γh
)
. (91)
The above resultant probability distributions are the
same as Eq. (89) and (90).
3. Local measurement
We have assumed the access structure parties have for-
warded their modes to a single party for global opera-
tions. Here we show that the measurement results of the
dealer and access structure remains strongly correlated
even if the access structure conducts local measurements
only.
Recall the strong correlation is represented by the nul-
lifiers pˆD − QˆA and qˆD − PˆA. Because they are linear
combinations of standard nullifiers, both the operators
QˆA and PˆA are sums of local operators, i.e.,
QˆA =
n∑
j
kqj Mˆ
q
j ; PˆA =
n∑
j
kpj Mˆ
p
j , (92)
where kqj and k
p
j are real coefficients; Mˆ
q
j and Mˆ
p
j are ro-
tated quadrature operators of mode j. After discussing
through secure classical channels to decide the measure-
ment basis to be QˆA or PˆA, the dealer and authorised
parties homodyne detect their modes according to the ba-
sis Mˆ qj or Mˆ
p
j . The measurement results are then shared
among access structure through secure classical channels.
Without loss of generality, we consider that the access
structure has chosen to measure QˆA. The measurement
result QA is a linear combination of local measurement
results M qj , i.e., QA =
∑n
j k
q
jM
q
j . The strong correla-
tion is observed from the joint probability distribution
of pD and QA, which we will show is the same as the
joint probability distribution of pD and qh. Consider the
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Wigner function of the state of the dealer and the ac-
cess structure, WDA(qD, pD, qA,pA) where qA and pA
are the quadrature variables of the access structure, is
obtained by tracing out the unauthorised parties’ contri-
butions in Wc in Eq. (7). When rewritten in terms of
the new variables M q = {M qj } and ∗M q = {∗M qj }, the
Wigner function becomes
WDA(qD, pD, qA,pA) ≡W ′DA(qD, pD,M q,∗M q) , (93)
where ∗M qj is the complementary variable of M qj , i.e.,
the corresponding operators satisfy [Mˆ qj , ∗Mˆ qj ] = i. The
choice of {∗Mˆ qj } is not unique, but we can pick the set
that PˆA is a linear combination of.
We construct another set of variables Q =
{QA, Q2, . . . , Qm} and P = {PA, P2, . . . , Pm}, where Q
(P ) involves linear combinations of {M qj } ({∗M qj }) only;
and the corresponding operators obey the commutation
relations: [Qˆj, Pˆl] = iδjl, [Qˆj , Qˆl] = 0, and [Pˆj , Pˆl] = 0.
Such a construction of variables is possible as there exists
unitary operators that transform Mˆ q to Qˆ and ˆ∗M
q
to
Pˆ while preserving the commutation relations. In terms
ofQ and P , the Wigner function can be further rewritten
as
W ′DA(qD, pD,M
q,∗M q) ≡W ′′DA(qD, pD,Q,P ) . (94)
The local measurement results follow a classical proba-
bility distribution P ′′DA, which is obtained by tracing out
the complementary components, i.e.,
P ′′DA(pD,M q) =
∫
W ′DAdqDd
m(∗M q1 )
=
∫
W ′′DAdqDd
mP , (95)
where the last equality is imposed because P is a linear
combination of ∗M q1 only. The probability distribution
of QA is obtained by tracing out the other independent
variables in P ′′DA, i.e.,
PDA(pD, QA) =
∫
P ′′DAdQ2dQ3 . . . . (96)
On the other hand, consider the access structure par-
ties’ modes are transferred to party h. The strong
quantum correlation is transferred to mode h by ap-
plying a global operation, UˆA, which transforms QˆA →
UˆAQˆAUˆ
†
A = qˆh and PˆA → UˆAPˆAUˆ †A = pˆh. Other oper-
ators are transformed as Qˆj → yˆj and Pˆj → zˆj . Using
the definition in Eqs. (93) and (94), the Wigner function
becomes
WDA(qD, pD, q,p)→W ′′DA(qD, pD, qh, ph,y, z) , (97)
where y = (y2, . . . , ym)
T and z = (z2, . . . , zm)
T . Be-
cause Qˆj and Pˆj commute with both QˆA and PˆA, the
transformed operators yˆj and zˆj do not contain any at-
tributes of mode h. The joint probability distribution
of pˆD and qˆh is obtained from the Wigner function after
tracing out the modes other than mode D and h, as well
as the complementary variables qD and ph, i.e.,
PDA(pD, qh) =
∫
W ′′DAdqDdphd
m−1ydm−1z . (98)
The probability distribution in Eqs. (96) and (98) are
deduced by different procedures. The former one is de-
duced by first obtaining the classical probability distri-
bution of all local measurements, and then extracting
the probability distribution of the classical variable QA;
the later one is deduced by first achieving the Wigner
function of the transformed quantum state, and then ob-
taining the measurement probability of the operator qˆh.
However, Eqs. (96) and (98) are mathematically equiva-
lent because their overall derivations are the same: trac-
ing out all quadrature variables in the Wigner function
except those specifying the strong correlation. Similar
analysis can be applied to the correlation between qD
and PA. As a result, the access structure can obtain the
same covariance matrix as we have discussed previously.
Hence the secret sharing rate remains unchanged even if
the access structure’s modes are measured locally.
4. Simplified CQ protocol
Incorporating the above ideas, the CQ protocol can
be simplified as follow: an (n + 1) cluster state or an n
mode mixed state is prepared by the dealer and delivered.
Parties in the access structure have agreed on the mea-
surement basis in each round, local measurements are
conducted on each received modes. The classical mea-
surement results are shared among the access structure
through secure classical channels. Both the dealer and
the access structure announce half of the results to esti-
mate the covariance matrix; while the other half is scaled
and mixed so the covariance matrix is in the standard
form. The variance and the analogous channel parame-
ters are then recognised for calculating the secret sharing
rate. Finally a secure key is distilled from the strongly
correlated measurement results, the key is then used for
sharing classical secrets.
We end this section with two comments. First, al-
though the quantum channels for delivering cluster states
are assumed to be ideal, we believe a modified ver-
sion of our protocol would allow CQ QSS with realis-
tic (lossy and noisy) channels. The covariance matrix of
the delivered modes can still be obtained by parameter-
estimation, and subsequent classical manipulations can
always turn the measurement results to obey the stan-
dard covariance matrix.
Second, in all the examples we have investigated, the
entanglement with the unauthorised parties’ modes only
add noise to the access structure parties’ modes, but the
analogous transmittance are retained as 1. This result
is surprising in the scenario of CV-QKD, because im-
perfection is always simulated by adding noise into a
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beam splitter which reduces transmittance. We believe
this phenomenon originates from the distinctive entangle-
ment structure in the resource states between CQ QSS
(a cluster state) and CV-QKD (an EPR state).
V. QQ QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
In the QQ setting of QSS, the dealer shares a secret
quantum state among parties by delivering a multipar-
tite entangled state. The channels connecting the dealer
and the parties can be insecure, so the unauthorised par-
ties can manipulate all the delivered states. In an ideal
QQ protocol, the access structure can recover the secret
state with perfect fidelity, while the unauthorised parties
cannot get any information about the state due to the
quantum no-cloning theorem [39].
Our QQ QSS scheme is a generalisation of the CQ pro-
tocol. The dealer prepares an (n+1) mode cluster state,
of which n modes are distributed to the parties while one
is kept by the dealer. After forming the collaborations,
the access structure parties forward their modes to party
h. We assume the parties are connected by secure quan-
tum channels, so the access structure can combine their
modes without being eavesdropped. A global operation
is applied to extract a strongly entangled state between
mode D and a single mode h.
For an infinitely squeezed QQ cluster state, the strong
correlation between the dealer and the access structure
is represented by the nullifiers pˆD − QˆA and qˆD − PˆA.
After all modes are gathered in party h, an operation UˆA
is applied to transfer the quantum correlation to mode
h, i.e., QˆA → UˆAQˆAUˆ †A = qˆh and PˆA → UˆAPˆAUˆ †A = pˆh.
We note that both the nullifiers, QˆA and PˆA, and the
operation UˆA are the same as that in the corresponding
CQ protocol in Sec. IV.
The transformed nullifiers, pˆD − qˆh and qˆD − pˆh, indi-
cate that the dealer and party h are sharing an infinitely
squeezed two-mode cluster state, which is a CV maxi-
mally entangled state (for infinite energy). By jointly
measuring the secret state and the two-mode cluster, the
dealer can teleport the secret state to mode h. After ap-
propriate error correction according to the dealer’s mea-
surement results, party h can revert the secret state with
perfect fidelity.
In the finitely squeezing case, party h conducts the
same UˆA to transform the strong correlation to mode h.
However, mode D and mode h are not maximally entan-
gled, because their state is finitely squeezed and is weakly
entangled to other modes. Conducting teleportation us-
ing the non-maximal entanglement will reduce the fidelity
of the teleported state. The inaccurately shared secret
state may indicate a reduction of security of the QQ QSS,
because some information about the secret state would
be leaked through the measurement results announced by
the dealer, and through the states held by the adversary
structure that are weakly entangled with the teleported
state.
Instead of conducting teleportation after each round
of QQ QSS, we consider the extracted state is stored in
quantum memories. After rounds of the QQ protocol, a
more entangled state can be distilled from the stored ex-
tracted states through CV entanglement distillation [40–
44]. Although distilling a maximally entangled CV state
is impossible due to the infinite required energy, the en-
richment of entanglement can enhance the fidelity of the
teleportation.
The amount of entanglement of the distilled state is
determined by that of each extracted state, as well as the
number of extracted states accumulated in the quantum
memory. We quantify the amount of entanglement by the
logarithmic negativity E [45], which is the upper bound of
the distillable entanglement. The logarithmic negativity
of a state ρˆ is defined as
E(ρˆ) = log ||ρˆTA ||1 , (99)
where the superscript TA denotes a partial transpose of
the density matrix; || · ||1 is the trace norm. If ρˆ is a
two-mode Gaussian state with a covariance matrix V ,
the logarithmic negativity can be calculated as
E(ρˆ) =
∑
k
F (ν˜k) , (100)
where F (x) = − log(2x) if x < 1/2, and F (x) = 0 if
x ≥ 1/2; {ν˜k} is the symplectic spectrum of V˜ , which is
defined as [46]
V˜ =
(
I 0
0 Z
)
· V ·
(
I 0
0 Z
)
. (101)
The covariance matrix V can be obtained by randomly
measuring some of the stored states in either qˆ or pˆ.
Because logarithmic negativity is additive [45], at least
E0/E extracted states with logarithmic negativity E is re-
quired to distill a two-mode squeezed vacuum state with
logarithmic negativity E0. In this section, we demon-
strate the procedure of extraction, and calculate the log-
arithmic negativity of the extracted state in each round
of the (2,3)- and the (3,5)-protocols.
We note that logarithmic negativity is additive but
not strongly superadditive [36], so the amount of entan-
glement may be overestimated if the access structure’s
modes in different rounds are entangled [47], i.e., when
the unauthorised parties conduct coherent attacks on the
delivered modes. In that case, the amount of entangle-
ment should be characterised by other strongly super-
additive entanglement measures, such as distillable en-
tanglement and squashed entanglement [36]. However,
logarithmic negativity is applicable in the current case
because of our assumption of ideal quantum channels, so
the access structure is expected to get the same states
as prepared by the dealer. The adversary structure par-
ties only get information about the shared secret through
their modes obtained in each round, which is effectively
a collective attack.
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A. Example 1 of QQ Quantum secret sharing:
(2,3)-protocol
In the (2,3) QQ protocol, any two out of the three
participating parties can recover the shared secret state
with high fidelity, while any one party achieves much
less information about the secret. This protocol can be
implemented by the same diamond-shaped CV cluster
state as that for the (2,3)-CQ protocol in Sec. IVC. In
the infinitely squeezing case, the nullifiers are given by
Eq. (54), and these nullifiers with Eq. (7) characterise
the finitely squeezed cluster state.
Three different collaborations can be formed: parties 1
and 2, parties 1 and 3, and parties 2 and 3. The entangle-
ment structure of the state of {1, 2} collaboration is the
same as that of {1, 3} collaboration, as their states are
equivalent up to a local unitary. As a result, the entan-
glement extracted between the dealer and parties {1, 2}
is the same as that between the dealer and parties {1, 3}.
For the {1, 2} collaboration, the quantum correlation
can be transferred to mode 2 by the {1,2} Decoding Se-
quence in Sec IVC1. In the infinitely squeezing case, the
nullifiers in Eq. (55), which specifies the strong correla-
tion, is transformed to pˆD− qˆ2 and qˆD− pˆ2. An infinitely
squeezed two-mode cluster is hence extracted for telepor-
tation. In the finitely squeezing case, the {1,2} Decoding
Sequence also transfers the strong correlation to party
2. The covariance matrix of the extracted state between
mode D and mode 2 is given by VDA;{1,2} in Eq. (56).
For the {2, 3} collaboration, the quantum correlation,
which is specified by the nullifiers in Eq. (64), can be
transferred to party 2 by applying a 50:50 beam split-
ter between mode 2 and mode 3. An infinitely squeezed
two-mode cluster state between mode D and mode 2 is
extracted in the infinitely squeezing case. While in the
finitely squeezing case, a strongly entangled state is ex-
tracted with the covariance matrix VDA;{2,3} in Eq. (56).
B. Example 2 of QQ Quantum secret sharing:
(3,5)-protocol
In the (3,5)-QQ protocol, any three out of the five par-
ticipating parties can recover the shared secret state with
high fidelity, while fewer than three parties achieve much
less information about the secret. This protocol can be
implemented by the same pentagonal CV cluster state
as used for the (3,5)-CQ protocol in Section IVD. In
the infinitely squeezing case, the nullifiers is given by
Eq. (67), and these nullifiers with Eq. (7) characterise
the finitely squeezed cluster state. Two categories of col-
laborations can be formed: three neighbouring parties,
and two neighbours with one disjoint party. Within each
category, the procedure of decoding and the final entan-
glement extracted are the same for each collaboration.
Take the parties {1, 2, 3} as an example of the three
neighbouring parties collaboration. The quantum corre-
lation can be transferred to party 2 by the {1,2,3} De-
FIG. 6: Logarithmic negativity of the state extracted from
a CV cluster state in QQ QSS. Left panel: (2,3)-protocol
for {2,3} collaboration (solid line) and {1,3} collaboration
(dashed line). Right panel: (3,5)-protocol for {1,2,3} collab-
oration (solid line) and {1,3,4} collaboration (dashed line).
coding Sequence in Sec IVD 1. In the infinitely squeezing
case, the nullifiers in Eq. (68) that specify the strong cor-
relation are transformed to pˆD−qˆ2 and qˆD−pˆ2. This indi-
cates an infinitely squeezed two-mode cluster is extracted
in mode D and mode 2. While in the finitely squeezing
case, the sequence of operations extracts a strongly en-
tangled state with the covariance matrix VDA;{1,2,3} in
Eq. (69).
On the other hand, parties {1, 3, 4} is an example of
the two neighbours with one disjoint party collaboration.
The quantum correlations can be transferred to party 1
by the {1,3,4} Decoding Sequence in Sec IVD2. In the
infinitely squeezing case, an infinitely squeezed two-mode
cluster is extracted in mode D and mode 1, because the
nullifiers in Eq. (74) that specify the strong correlation
is transformed to pˆD − qˆ1 and qˆD − pˆ1. While in the
finitely squeezing case, a strongly entangled state is ex-
tracted, and its covariance matrix is given by VDA;{1,3,4}
in Eq. (75).
The logarithmic negativity of the extracted state
for different collaborations in the (2,3)- and the (3,5)-
protocols is calculated using Eq. (100) with the corre-
sponding covariance matrices. The result is plotted in
Fig. 6 against different squeezing parameters.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we extended the unified cluster state
quantum secret sharing framework proposed in [10, 16]
into the continuous-variable regime. We proposed that
all three tasks of quantum secret sharing can be imple-
mented by CV cluster states. Although a QQ protocol
can be used to conduct CC and CQ, simplifications in
the later two scenarios can reduce the requirement of
resources. For a CC protocol involving n parties, only
n-mode cluster states are needed, and the states can be
measured once received. A CQ protocol requires either
a mixture of two n-mode Gaussian states or an (n + 1)-
mode cluster state. The states can be locally measured
once it is received. A QQ protocol requires (n+1)-mode
cluster states. The states have to be transferred to one
party and accumulated in quantum memories for entan-
glement distillation.
On the contrary to discrete-variable systems, where no
known physical principle hinders the creation of a max-
imally entangled state, the creation of a maximally en-
tangled CV state requires infinite energy and is thus not
practical. Finitely squeezed states are realistic substi-
tutes for the maximally entangled resources, but the non-
maximal entanglement would leak information about the
shared secret to the unauthorised parties. We proposed
computable measures to account for the security of each
of the three tasks of quantum secret sharing. The secret
sharing rate of a CC protocol is the difference between
the mutual information between the dealer and the ac-
cess structure, and the adversary structure’s information
that is capped by the Holevo bound. The secret sharing
rate of a CQ protocol can be computed by the secure key
rate of the analogous QKD protocol. The performance of
a QQ protocol can be determined by the amount of ex-
tracted entanglement between the dealer and the access
structure.
Although we have analysed only the (2,3)- and the
(3,5)- protocols that are both threshold protocols [4],
our technique is applicable to non-threshold protocols be-
cause the security analysis involves only the variance of
measurement results of the dealer and the access struc-
ture. Security of general continuous-variable CQ and QQ
protocols can also be analysed using our techniques, i.e.,
transferring the strong correlation to mode h and then
compute the covariance matrix between mode D and
mode h, even if the resource state is not a continuous-
variable cluster state.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
one showing that quantum secret sharing is feasible with
finitely squeezed CV resources. Since a finitely squeezed
cluster state can be deterministically constructed using
only offline squeezers and linear optics, which are practi-
cally available resources in current technology, we believe
CV quantum secret sharing can be implemented in the
near future. An important remaining question is to de-
termine if the performance of quantum secret sharing is
seriously worsened under the presence of environmental
and apparatus noise. As we borrow the security analysis
techniques from QKD, which works well in noisy circum-
stances, it is likely that realistic performance of quantum
secret sharing can be analysed using the formalisms pre-
sented in this work.
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